What is at stake in Honduras?, por Sufyan Droubi

06/11/2009 por Equipe de Colaboradores 0 Comentários

On June 28^th, the Honduran Supreme Court decided for the destitution of Manuel Zelaya from his seat as a president, finding that he would have breached the Constitution by, inter alia, seeking a plebiscite so as to consult the population on the convening of a constituent assembly to modify the Constitution (see Corte Suprema de Justicia 2009). The Court ordered the Army to enforce its ruling and what followed was not only a forced deposition of Zelaya from his seat but also his expulsion from the country. The presidency has been temporarily occupied by Roberto Micheletti, the head of the Congress, pursuant to a constitutional rule that, in the absence of the president and the vice-president – Elvin Santos renounced his seat as vice-president in December 2008 – the head of Congress should assume the presidency. Forbidden to come back to Honduras, Zelaya sneaked back into the country on September 21 and found shelter within the Brazilian embassy.

The deposition had immediate international consequences, becoming an international dispute as the new government failed in obtaining the recognition of the international community and as the crisis proved able to divide the same community. Indeed, despite its formal compliance with the Constitution, the deposition was considered a coup d’état by all states, the UN, the OAS etc., in a clear, rare application of the Tobar doctrine. At the same time, the polarization of the internal forces, with one side upholding the constitutionality of the deposition, and the other denying it, was exported to some states, such as Brazil and the United States. Note that the international community, including the US and Brazil, stayed in line with the conciliation plan (the pact of San José) put forward by the President of Costa Rica, providing inter alia for the restitution of Zelaya. Nevertheless, inside Brazil and the US, the opposition to the official policy towards Honduras became stronger by the date (Sheridan 2009). Rumors that the US would finally be contemplating the realization of the elections without Zelaya indicated the potential that the crisis has to “divide the hemisphere” (see Marreiro e Maisonnave 2009).

Amidst the intricacies of facts, rumors, divergent interests, etc., in motion, more attention should have been paid to one aspect. By seeking a plebiscite with the support of a great part of the population (Avila 2009; also Youth of ODECO 2009), Zelaya may have violated the Constitution he swore to protect – but he also brought to light the fact that the same Constitution was suffering from a classical case of legitimation crisis (Habermas 1975), which not only prompted, but actually gave him oxygen to pursue the convening of a constituent assembly, following the example of other states in Latin America. Nevertheless, negotiations were pushed forward without due consideration to this point: Zelaya, for instance, complained that “the dialogue with the [current] government is not sincere” because the people would be excluded from it; he would be allowed communication with religious people and politicians, but not a direct communication with the people and, especially, the businessmen (Folha Online 2009).

As one may conclude, such environment is by no means favorable to negotiations aiming at a solid pact. An agreement providing for a national unity government headed by Zelaya to lead the country through the November elections, was finally reached under strong US pressure last week (Sheridan e DeYoung 2009). But the accord needs to be ratified by the Congress, following its submission to the Supreme Court, and Zelaya expects both to happen in time for him to return to power and lead the November elections. Several rumors – that he would not be allowed to return, that Micheletti would be choosing the names for the “unity government” independently of him, etc. – turn the perspective that the “crisis is over” a bit unrealistic. Finally, and much more important, Zelaya accepted not to pursue any avenue leading to a constituent assembly (France Presse 2009).

It seems that what is at stake in Honduras is not only the return of Zelaya to power, nor even the realization of the November elections in time, but the need of a national debate on the faith of a constitutional order that has been suffering from a legitimation crisis, which has not been properly dealt with by those involved in settling the dispute down. The question that would have been subject of the plebiscite – ¿Está de acuerdo que en las elecciones generales de 2009 se instale una cuarta urna en la cual el pueblo decida la convocatoria a una asamblea nacional constituyente? Si / No” – remains unanswered. Also, the young Honduran democratic institutions proved not strong enough to, on the one hand, absorb new expectations of a great part of the population and, on the other, withstand the pressure arising from the complex international repercussions of the crisis. The Honduran people suddenly found themselves under the rule of a non-elected administration which resorted to force to guarantee public order. In this scenario, the postponement of a national debate on the need to modify the constitutional framework may give the region a respite, but is likely to trigger another and eventually more severe crisis in the future. The main challenge, then, let me suggest, is for the international community to help the parties in Honduras to reach a renewed political pact that, independently of representing the willingness of the international community, proves able to absorb, neutralize old and new public expectations, and to hold once the international community goes back to its day-to-day concerns far removed from Honduras.

Bibliography

Meridiano 47 – Boletim de Análise de Conjuntura em Relações Internacionais

Corte Suprema de Justicia. 2009. Comunicado Especial. Junho. http://www.poderjudicial.gob.hn/NR/rdonlyres/87E2BFFC-AF4D-44EA-BFC5-D93730D8D81C/2413/ExpedienteJudicial1.pdf.

Folha Online. 2009. OEA vê vontade de diálogo em Honduras, Outubro 3. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/mundo/ult94u632934.shtml.

Folha Online

Legitimation crisis

Folha de S Paulo

The Washington Post

The Narco News Bulletin